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Roma are mainly located in South Eastern Europe and with
a population of approximately six million people they consti-
tute the largest ethnic minority in the continent (Open Society
Institute, 2008). 1 They experience severe social exclusion in
terms of high poverty levels (European Union Agency for
Fundamental Rights, 2014), low educational attainments
(Brueggemann, 2012) 2 and no participation in the political
and cultural life (Kocze, 2012).
Schooling is considered to be a remedy to alleviate poverty
and improve living conditions of disadvantaged ethnic or
racial groups and to foster their integration: higher enrollment
rates and better achievement at school are expected to lead to
persistent eﬀects in the labor market and in the reduction of
poverty in the long-run. The Roma Teaching Assistant
(RTA) Program is the main intervention targeting Roma
inclusion in education in South Eastern Europe. Roma assis-
tants—one per school—participate in regular lessons where
they provide additional help to Roma pupils who have diﬃcul-
ties in following classes. They organize additional lessons, help
them with their homework and assignments and once per week
visit to their parents.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the RTA
Program in the ﬁrst year of its introduction. 3 We examine the
causal eﬀect of the RTA Program by asking the following
three questions. Does the program reduce dropouts? Does
the program raise attendance? Does the program improve
marks? To answer these questions, we use primary data col-
lected during ﬁve months in the Summer–Autumn 2010. We
employ two diﬀerent econometric strategies and their combi-
nation. First, we exploit the gradual implementation and
the intensity of the program in order to base the evaluation
of its impact on a comparison of Early and Late Enrollees.
Second, we compare children exposed to the program to
older cohorts less exposed to it. There is evidence that all
children exposed to the program went on average more to
school. We also ﬁnd evidence that marks improved in mathe-
matics and Serbian for ﬁrst graders. Higher impacts are
obtained in schools with a lower number of Roma. This is
especially the case for girls, for whom being in a school with
a lower number of Roma turns out to be more favorable. Boys62respond to the program with fewer absences in schools with
fewer Roma.
Only a handful of studies focus on the issues related to the
education of Roma people. These studies investigate topics
such as the eﬀects of school segregation and the importance
of aﬃrmative actions, the role of preschool, and the
Roma/Non Roma achievement gap. In many countries in
Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe, Roma pupils
are often segregated from Non Roma pupils and unjustiﬁably
placed in schools for mentally disabled children. The atten-
dance of these so-called special schools has a negative eﬀect
on educational attainment and on later labor market out-
comes (O’Higgins & Brueggemann, 2014). Thus desegregation
policies are necessary and governments have committed to
desegregating schools, but their implementation has not been
successful (Rostas & Kostka, 2014). Conversely, aﬃrmative
action policies are an important tool for increasing the access
to higher education for Roma (Garaz, 2014). 4 The attendance
of preschool has been shown to help to reduce the gap in
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Moreover, two interesting studies (Baucal, 2006; Kertesi &
Kezdi, 2011) investigate the Roma/Non Roma gap and ﬁnd
large diﬀerences in educational outcomes between Roma and
Non Roma. Both studies show that the achievement gap
between the two groups decreases when accounting for the
lower socio-economical status of Roma. 6
The principal contribution of this paper is that it adds evi-
dence on short-term eﬀects of remedial education targeting a
stigmatized ethnic group. Rigorous evaluations of remedial
education programs are rare. Policies targeting
low-performing students are generally diﬃcult to evaluate
because children with learning diﬃculties are not randomly
assigned to programs. A few studies are able to overcome the
identiﬁcation problem and they ﬁnd support for the eﬀective-
ness of remedial education in the short run (Banerjee, Cole,
Duﬂo, & Linden, 2007; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2002;
Jacob&Lefgren, 2004; Lavy& Schlosser, 2005). The RTAPro-
gram is diﬀerent from a standard remedial education interven-
tion because it targets a marginalized group that is widespread
believed to be diﬀerent and cannot be integrated. In this case it
would not be enough to oﬀer “only” remedial education,
because the program could be ineﬀective for two reasons. First,
an additional Non Roma teacher could have low expectations
and could not put in eﬀort. Baucal (2006) in fact shows that
in Serbia school teachers have lower expectations from Roma
and that they dedicate less time to them thus this mechanism
could be especially important in our context. Second, the chil-
dren could not respond to the program because of expected
low returns to education. Jensen (2010) has demonstrated that
expected returns do aﬀect the schooling decision. Therefore, the
way in which the RTA Program aﬀects both the demand and
supply side of education is as follows. On the one hand, children
are provided with more teaching time. The intervention alters
the inputs in the education production function by providing
more instruction time to pupils through teaching assistants.
Additionally, negative stereotypes about Roma students could
be softened and teachers themselves could be providing more
support in learning. This is part of the supply side of education.
On the other hand, Roma teaching assistant has the same back-
ground as the targeted children and she acts as a role model for
them. The role model mechanism can aﬀect preferences for edu-
cation of both children and parents and is expected to aﬀect the
demand for education of the Roma population. 7
This study also speaks to the literature on programs aiming
at improving schooling outcomes of minority communities
and the poor. The United States has a long tradition of work
on evaluations of school programs targeting disadvantaged
groups. A wide range of programs across diﬀerent stages of
the life cycle have been evaluated. Some of the well-known pri-
mary school interventions include after-school programs
(Lauer, Akiba, Wilkerson, Apthorp, Snow, & Martin-Glenn,
2006), merit pay for principals, teachers, and students
(Fryer, 2010; Podgursky & Springer, 2007), professional devel-
opment for teachers (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, &
Wyckoﬀ, 2009), getting parents to be more involved
(Domina, 2005), placing disadvantaged students in better
schools through desegregation busing (Angrist & Lang,
2004) or altering the neighborhoods in which they live
(Jacob, 2004; Sanbonmatsu, Kling, Duncan, &
Brooks-Gunn, 2006). The evidence on the eﬃcacy of these
interventions is mixed: certain programs have left the achieve-
ment gap essentially unchanged while others were more suc-
cessful. This literature thus underscores the importance of
rigorous evaluations in order to use the available ﬁnancial
resources in the most eﬃcient way.An additional contribution of this paper is that we give an
accurate overview of the attainments of Roma pupils, for
which so far the data were limited, and contrast their achieve-
ment to the average Non Roma pupils. Our study is able to
examine a wide range of outcomes which have been not exam-
ined jointly to this date (such as dropouts and absences) due to
limited availability of data. To get a better understanding of
the eﬀectiveness of an intervention it is important to under-
stand if and at which margin it is working. Policies that pro-
mote school enrollment may not promote learning (Miguel
& Kremer, 2004; Schultz, 2004). We believe that the outcomes
we use together with marks give a complete overview of the
current state of educational achievements of Roma pupils.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the Serbian context that we are studying. Section 3
summarizes the Roma Teaching Assistant Program and
describes our data. Sections 4 explains our empirical strategy
and presents our results. Section 5 discusses the ﬁndings and
concludes.2. COUNTRY CONTEXT
Data on Roma in Serbia are inaccurate and scarce. Surveys
often lack information about ethnic identity of the respon-
dents. More importantly, when asked about their ethnicity,
some Roma people do not declare themselves as Roma. Most
of them consider themselves both Roma and Serbian and the
question of nationality allows only one answer.
The oﬃcial 2011 census counts 147,600 Roma, while esti-
mates put forward a number between 350,000 and 500,000
or approximately 5–7% of the overall population (Stojanovic´
& Baucal, 2007). Most Roma live in segregated settlements
and have diﬀerent demographic characteristics from the rest
of the population. According to the World Bank Living Stan-
dard Measurement Survey (LSMS) 2003—which provides a
boosted sample of Roma in Serbia—their households are
more numerous than the average household, they have more
children and their population is younger. The percentage of
male Roma who declare to have worked over the last week
is similar to the national average (69%). Contrary to men,
the participation of women is 34% and considerably lower
than the national average (53%). Overall, approximately
60% of Roma have a consumption below the poverty line
and weekly consumption of food per household member is
half the national average.
Turning to education, 60% of Roma younger than 18 years
have not completed primary education. In contrast, only 20%
of overall population do not have a primary school diploma.
Out of all children of primary school-age, 30% of Roma do
not attend school whereas this is the case for only 1% of the
overall population of primary school-age. Using data from
the National Assessment Study conducted with third-grade
students, Baucal (2006) ﬁnds that after the ﬁrst three years
of school Roma pupils lag 2.2–2.5 years behind the average
student. Also, children from Roma ethnic minority performed
worse on standardized tests than Non Roma children with the
same socio-economic background.
The main barriers of access to education for Roma are
absence of documents, ﬁnancial constraints, parents’ low
educational background, child labor, discrimination from
teachers and pupils and language barriers (Open Society
Institute, 2008). In the recent years Serbian schools started
enrolling children with incomplete documents, but there is still
a minor number of children not able to enroll due to lack of
them. According to the law, the local government should
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school-age in the municipality have to enroll at school. But
Roma are often not regularly registered as residents in the
municipality and the local government is not able to reach
out to them. School books and additional school material
are a signiﬁcant burden for the budget of poor families and
the most poor among Roma children do not even own ade-
quate clothing for winter months and live in overcrowded
homes where they do not have adequate conditions to pursue
their studies. A majority of Roma parents have low educa-
tional attainment and this implies that they often cannot help
their children with their school work. In addition, some par-
ents attach little value to schooling and education. These rea-
sons together imply that the perceived beneﬁts of going to
school are lower than respective costs. Moreover, in some
cases Roma children help their parents in their jobs. Also,
Roma pupils can face discrimination from teachers and other
pupils. There is anecdotal evidence that they are often seated
in the last row in classrooms, that teachers do not read their
homework and that teachers do not encourage them in their
studies. Another problematic issue is that a considerable share
of them is sent to special schools. 8 Finally, in a survey con-
ducted by UNICEF—Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey,
2006—only 10% of Roma declare Serbian to be their mother
tongue. Children may face diﬃculties at school due to limited
knowledge of Serbian. 93. ROMA TEACHING ASSISTANT PROGRAM AND
DATA
(a) The Roma Teaching Assistant Program
The Roma Teaching Assistant Program started as a pilot
program implemented by various NGOs in 2002. In 2007
the OSCE took over its coordination and ﬁnancing. In 2009
the program started to have a nation-wide coverage and it is
now under the coordination of the Ministry of Education.
In the scholastic year 2009–10, 48 primary schools had a
Roma assistant: 22 schools started with the program at diﬀer-
ent points of time during 2002–07; 26 schools started in 2009.
The Ministry expanded the program to other 77 schools start-
ing from November 2010.
Based on when the program started in a school, the schools
can be divided in two groups: schools entering the program in
September 2009 (Early Enrollees) and schools entering the
program in November 2010 (Late Enrollees). The 22 schools,
which joined the program during 2002–07, are excluded from
our analysis. The selection of these schools was not central-
ized: they were chosen by NGOs based on the share of Roma
pupils. For our analysis we will consider only 26 Early
Enrollees and 77 Late Enrollees.
Both schools and potential Roma assistants had to apply to
participate in the program. Among 78 schools that applied in
2009, a commission representing the government institutions
together with OSCE representatives, chose 26 Early Enrollee
schools based on the percentage of Roma students (between
5% and 40%) and preferably, the availability of a preschool
program in the school. 10 The requirements for Roma assis-
tants were knowledge of Romani, secondary school diploma,
and experience in working with children. 158 candidates
applied for 26 assistant positions. 11 In 2010 the program
was renamed as Education for all and starting with the scholas-
tic year 2010–11 Roma teaching assistants were renamed to
pedagogical assistants. In year 2010, 252 schools applied for
77 assistants. Similar to the ﬁrst round, schools were eligibleonly if they had between 5% and 40% of Roma. The only dif-
ference between the two rounds was that in the second round
the availability of a preschool program was not considered.
The reason is that in 2010–11 pedagogical assistants started
to work in 50 kindergartens oﬀering compulsory preschool
program. Schools not oﬀering the preschool program could
have then been close to kindergartens oﬀering it. The Roma
pupil would have been helped by an assistant from her entry
in the school anyhow. One could argue that this small change
in requirements could lead to a selection bias in the two
rounds, but our data do not support this claim. 12 Selection
criteria for now pedagogical assistants remained unchanged
and out of the 329 applications for the position, 77 were
accepted to work at schools and another 50 were accepted
for kindergartens.
Schools got to know that they would receive an assistant in
early June. They did not inform parents about the presence of
the RTAs. The program did not receive publicity from TV and
radio. This leads us to believe that parents were not aware of
the existence of the RTA before enrolling their children at
school. Data also conﬁrm that Early Enrollees did not attract
more Roma students than Late Enrollees in the ﬁrst year of the
program. 13 There is no selection of children into schools.
Every school received only one assistant. Schools received
from the Ministry a description of her duties, but they were
free to decide how to allocate the time of the assistant depend-
ing on the needs of the school. 14 Activities at school involve
both working during regular classes and after-school work.
Work with local communities comprises duties such as collect-
ing information about children who did not enroll or who left
school, gathering documents for school enrollment, visiting
families, 15 cooperation with Roma NGOs, etc. The assistants
were advised to work mainly with lower grades, especially the
ﬁrst. Their objectives were to ensure that children go to school,
to prevent them from dropping out and to help them to suc-
ceed at school. In 2009 the Ministry of Education organized
a series of seminars with the goal of providing the necessary
knowledge and skills to Roma teaching assistants. 16
(b) Data and trends of the variables
We use primary data collected during ﬁve months in the
summer/autumn 2010. School data were not available in a dig-
ital format and we visited schools and collected in person data
from administrative records. Our dataset contains information
on 23 schools (out of 26) among Early Enrollees and 15
schools (out of 77) among Late Enrollees. 17 Given that the
data collection process was costly, our dataset consists only
of a subsample of Late Enrollees. We selected 15 Late Enrollee
schools according to the following criteria: ﬁrst, they had to be
in the same district of an Early Enrollee school 18; second, they
had to be in a rural/urban municipality as the nearby Early
Enrollee school; third, they had to share a similar school size
to the nearby Early Enrollee school and ﬁnally, a similar per-
centage of Roma pupils. 19
Schools are mainly in Belgrade/Central Serbia and in the
South/South-Eastern part of the nation, and they are equally
distributed in rural and urban areas. 20 Figure 1 reports the
distribution of schools in our sample.
The data set contains information on four scholastic years—
from 2006–07 to 2009–10—for the lower four grades of pri-
mary school for 18,268 Roma and Non Roma children. It con-
tains for each year and for each pupil the ﬁnal mark in
mathematics, ﬁnal mark in Serbian, and number of hours of
absences in a year. 21 The data set contains individual charac-
teristics, such as gender, year of birth, month of birth, and
Figure 1. Location of the schools with assistants. This ﬁgure reports the distribution of schools in our sample. In pink municipalities there are only Early
Enrollee school; in green municipalities there are only Late Enrollee school and in dark blue municipalities there are both Early and Late Enrollee schools. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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ber of Roma—in both school and class—and whether the
school is in an urban setting.
Roma children Table 1 shows summary statistics of the
covariates and main outcomes of interest for Roma children
in pre- and treatment years.
In the pre-treatment year the mean characteristics of the
schools that were enrolled in the program later (column (2),
Table 1) resemble those of the schools that enrolled ﬁrst (col-
umn (1), Table 1). Boys and girls are equally distributed in
both groups of schools (roughly 50% of students in Early
Enrollee and 47% in Late Enrollee schools are female) and
pupils were mainly born in the same town where they attend
school (87% in Early Enrollee and 81% in Late Enrollee
schools). Average pupil’s age is 8.7 in both schools. 23 A ﬁfth
of all students in the schools are Roma. The number of Roma
per class is roughly 4–5 children and the class size is 22.161 in
Early Enrollees and 23.966 in Late Enrollees. The table shows
no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between Early Enrollees
and Late Enrollees nor in the students’ and schools’ character-
istics nor in the outcomes of interest. This similarity in covari-
ates between Early Enrollee and Late Enrollee schools is also
found in the treatment year, providing support for our claim
that Early Enrollees and Late Enrollees are comparable. 24
By simply comparing average outcomes in the two types of
schools, we see that in the last year dropouts almost double in
both types of schools and absences increase in both Early
Enrollees and Late Enrollees, but they increase by less in Early
Enrollee schools. We believe that both the increase in dropoutsTable 1. Roma—means of covariates and outc
Pre-treatment year
Early enrollees Late enrollees D
(1) (2) (3)
Character
Female 0.502 0.471
Age 8.748 8.675
Born in the same town 0.867 0.814
Roma per school 0.223 0.193
School size 304.937 361.506 
(
% of Roma per class 0.221 0.183
Class size 22.161 23.966
Outcom
Dropouta 0.015 0.019
Absences (hours) 118.103 125.378
(
Serbianb 2.430 2.547
Mathematicsb 2.284 2.370
Number of schools 23 15
Number of Roma pupils 1,241 811
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported
aDropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherw
bMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.and in absences is related to the liberalization of the visa
regime with the European Union. This regime change induced
a considerable number of Roma families to migrate to the EU.
Finally, we see a minor improvement in all marks from pre- to
treatment year. This eﬀect is larger in Early Enrollees than in
Late Enrollees.
Non Roma children. In our main analysis we focus on Roma
children because they are the students targeted by the pro-
gram. We do not aim at quantifying diﬀerences in school
achievement and attendance between Roma and Non Roma
as a consequence of the program and for all our estimations
we only use the sample of Roma. Data on Non Roma children
are used separately in Section A.4 in the Appendix exclusively
to investigate possible spillover eﬀects. Their characteristics
are reported here ﬁrst to provide additional evidence of the
comparability of Early and Late Enrollee schools in both
pre-treatment and treatment year and second to show substan-
tial diﬀerences in education between Roma and Non Roma.
Table 2 shows summary statistics of the covariates and main
outcomes of interest for Non Roma children in both years.
No statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences are found neither in
the pre- nor in the treatment year in the pupils’ characteristics,
providing further support for our claim that Early Enrollees
and Late Enrollees are comparable. Moreover, there are no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the outcomes, excepting
the dropout rate, which is close to zero and not problematic
in the lower primary school grades. Overall, average outcomes
suggest that there are no statistically signiﬁcant changes for
Non Roma children due to the program.omes in pre-treatment and treatment years
Treatment year
iﬀerence Early enrollees Late enrollees Diﬀerence
[(1)  (2)] (4) (5) (6) [(4)  (5)]
istics
0.031 0.486 0.469 0.017
(0.023) (0.026)
0.073 8.677 8.742 0.065
(0.089) (0.110)
0.053 0.877 0.807 0.070*
(0.038) (0.035)
0.030 0.235 0.194 0.041
(0.056) (0.057)
56.569 301.217 362.581 61.364
52.963) (56.046)
0.038 0.234 0.185 0.049
(0.056) (0.057)
1.804 22.438 24.213 1.775
(1.424) (1.381)
es
0.004 0.026 0.035 0.009
(0.006) (0.009)
7.275 134.037 155.528 21.491
13.722) (16.808)
0.117 2.496 2.568 0.072
(0.123) (0.144)
0.086 2.365 2.408 0.043
(0.125) (0.156)
23 15
1,268 847
in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
ise 0.
Table 2. Non Roma—Means of covariates and outcomes in pre-treatment and treatment years
Pre-treatment year Treatment year
Early enrollees Late enrollees Diﬀerence Early enrollees Late enrollees Diﬀerence
(1) (2) (3) [(1)  (2)] (4) (5) (6) [(4)  (5)]
Characteristics
Female 0.487 0.477 0.010 0.469 0.486 0.017
(0.014) (0.012)
Age 8.421 8.400 0.021 8.426 8.416 0.009
(0.066) (0.033)
Born in the same town 0.922 0.912 0.010 0.930 0.923 0.007
(0.011) (0.011)
Roma per school 0.223 0.193 0.030 0.235 0.194 0.041
(0.056) (0.057)
School size 304.937 361.506 56.569 301.217 362.581 61.364
(52.963) (56.046)
% of Roma per class 0.221 0.183 0.038 0.234 0.185 0.049
(0.056) (0.057)
Class size 22.161 23.966 1.804 22.438 24.213 1.775
(1.424) (1.381)
Outcomes
Dropouta 0.001 0.0006 0.0004 0.001 0.000 0.001**
(0.0006) (0.0005)
Absences (hours) 39.159 36.231 2.938 42.549 40.276 2.273
(2.535) (2.743)
Serbianb 4.396 4.328 0.068 4.434 4.339 0.094
(0.070) (0.072)
Mathematicsb 4.255 4.179 0.076 4.296 4.208 0.088
(0.080) (0.081)
Number of schools 23 15 23 15
Number of Non Roma pupils 4,303 3,374 4,122 3,514
Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
aDropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
bMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
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together show that the diﬀerences in dropouts, absences, and
marks between Roma and Non Roma children are striking.
Three important aspects need to be stressed when comparing
them. First, dropouts are almost exclusively of Roma children.
Moreover, Roma children are absent from school approxi-
mately three to four times more than Non Roma children.
Lastly, on a grading scale of 1 to 5, the diﬀerence of almost
two marks between Roma and Non Roma pupils in Serbian
and mathematics is substantial. These diﬀerences apply to
both genders. However, when we look more deeply into the
data we observe that among Roma, although girls perform
better at school than boys 25 (and diﬀerences by gender are
statistically signiﬁcant), their dropouts and absences are
higher. 26 There are indeed additional aspects we need to take
into account and that explains why in our analysis we also
investigate whether the impact of the intervention diﬀers by
gender. First, an extensive literature suggests that ethnicity
exacerbates gender-biased divisions (and vice versa) and that
intersection of gender and ethnicity is associated with system-
atic outcome disparities across groups, especially in human
capital, with consequences in the long-term (Tas, Reimo, &
Orlando, 2014). Second, female Roma have, on average, a
lower educational level, spend fewer years in school, and are
more likely to drop out from school than their male counter-
parts (Cukrowska & Kocze, 2013). Among Roma, traditional
gender roles are clearly deﬁned: girls marry at a young age and
are expected to take care of children and home. They more fre-
quently stay out of the labor market or work in informalemployment (Cukrowska & Kocze, 2013). The beneﬁts of
investing in education in the case of girls are perceived as
low. Diﬀerent impacts by gender of an educational program
can be expected. 274. ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY
We want to examine the impact of the Roma Teaching
Assistant Program in the ﬁrst year of its implementation on
dropouts, attendance, and marks of Roma pupils. In the fol-
lowing analysis we therefore use only data on Roma children.
We exploit the gradual implementation of the program. Our
treatment group consists of schools which started to imple-
ment the program in September 2009 (Early Enrollees),
whereas the control group is a subsample of schools which
got the assistants starting from November 2010 (Late Enrol-
lees). We argue that the selection of schools to enter the pro-
gram earlier/later can be treated “as if random” for several
reasons. First, the selection criteria remained almost the same
in both rounds. 28 Second, one could argue that schools apply-
ing in the ﬁrst round were more motivated, but schools which
applied in the ﬁrst year could also apply in the second year.
However, some schools which applied in 2009 did not apply
anymore in the year after. 29 Thus, if they really were more
motivated and of better quality, it is hard to understand
why they did not want to be part of the program anymore
in 2010. Third, we do know that observable characteristics
do not diﬀer between schools applying in the ﬁrst year and
Table 3. Average treatment approach
Eﬀect of program in treatment year
All All Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dropouta
Post 0.017** 0.015** 0.001 0.027**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012)
Treatment * post 0.006 0.003 0.028* 0.018
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
No. observations 4,167 4,039 1,951 2,088
Absences
Post 31.236*** 32.853*** 22.456*** 42.034***
(7.856) (9.078) (10.797) (10.764)
Treatment * post 17.299** 16.679* 4.713 26.119**
(7.856) (9.078) (10.797) (10.764)
No. observations 3,980 3,868 1,871 1,997
Serbianb
Post 0.039 0.046 0.079 0.027
(0.060) (0.048) (0.055) (0.050)
Treatment * post 0.044 0.012 0.035 0.058
(0.069) (0.066) (0.075) (0.080)
Mathematicsb
Post 0.051 0.065 0.096 0.041
(0.069) (0.062) (0.080) (0.056)
Treatment * post 0.046 0.030 0.015 0.053
(0.081) (0.077) (0.091) (0.085)
No. observations 4,085 3,961 1,916 2,045
Controlsc No Yes Yes Yes
School FE No Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the eﬀect of the program on dropouts, absences and Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the
school level are reported in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
aDropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
bMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per class,
class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, and migrant (=1).
68 WORLD DEVELOPMENTschools applying in the second year. 30 Fourth, we are in pos-
session of data for three years prior to the introduction of the
program and the placebo tests for these years support our
claim of no systematic diﬀerences between the two groups of
schools. Fifth, we do know that the committee for school
selection—composed of the Minister of Education and other
representatives of the Ministry, representatives of National
Council, OSCE, and of the Ministry for Human and Minority
Rights—rated schools based on their shown interest and moti-
vation (application) in the same way, in both years. 31
A second possible estimation strategy is to exploit the fact
that older cohorts were less exposed to the program (control
group) to younger cohorts (treated group) in Early Enrol-
lee-treated schools. 32
The main advantage of using as a control group schools
which enrolled later in the program is that its impact would
not be confounded with other government policies that took
place in the year of its introduction. For instance, in 2009–
10 all ﬁrst-grade pupils got free text books and in the last
few years the Ministry strongly suggests to schools to reduce
repetition rates especially in the lower grades. The weakness
of this control group lies in the fact that we cannot be com-
pletely certain that unobservable characteristics are the same
in Early Enrollee and Late Enrollee schools. In order to purge
time-invariant school characteristics, we can use older cohortsin the treatment schools as a control group. Nonetheless, this
econometric strategy relies on the strong assumptions that
there were no government interventions over the period—
which is not exactly our case—and that the outcomes have a
regular trend over the years. By combining the Early–Late
Enrollee analysis with the cohort speciﬁcation we better take
into account strengths and weaknesses of both approaches.
(a) First approach: comparison of Early Enrollees vs. Late
Enrollees
Our ﬁrst econometric strategy exploits the fact that some
schools received the assistants prior to other schools. We com-
pare Early Enrollee schools with Late Enrollee schools in the
years 2008–09—year before the introduction of the pro-
gram—and 2009–10—year of the introduction of the program.
(i) Average treatment approach
Our speciﬁcation (1) is a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model with
school ﬁxed eﬀects:
Y ijt ¼ b0 þ dt þ qj þ b1treatmentj  postt þ b2X 0ijt þ eijt ð1Þ
The outcome variables Y ijt are dropout, hours of absences in a
year, and ﬁnal marks in Serbian and mathematics of child i, in
Table 4. Average treatment approach—Placebo
Placebo tests for pretreatment years
2006–07 and 2007–08 2007–08 and 2008–09
All Female Male All Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropouta
Treatment * post 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.009) (0.017) (0.016) (0.010) (0.025) (0.014)
No. observations 3,640 1,776 1,864 3,897 1,897 2,000
Absences
Treatment * post 0.955 2.002 3.566 9.558 2.921 14.935
(12.592) (17.435) (14.753) (13.864) (19.448) (10.602)
No. observations 3,542 1,732 1,810 3,788 1,850 1,938
Serbianb
Treatment * post 0.059 0.141 0.025 0.094 0.103 0.053
(0.080) (0.105) (0.103) (0.077) (0.093) (0.072)
Mathematicsb
Treatment * post 0.080 0.093 0.067 0.057 0.102 0.007
(0.066) (0.075) (0.080) (0.077) (0.098) (0.080)
No. observations 3,585 1,750 1,835 3,846 1,876 1,970
Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results of the placebo regressions for pretreatment years for the average treatment approach. The outcomes of the regressions are
dropouts, absences, Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: *signiﬁcant
at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
aDropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
bMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per class,
class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, and migrant (=1).
EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ROMA TEACHING ASSISTANT PROGRAM IN SERBIA 69school j at time t. dt is a time ﬁxed eﬀect,qj corresponds to school
ﬁxed eﬀects, and treatmentj  postt is the interaction term
between the dummies for treatment status of the school and
treatment year. Dropout is a dummy variable taking the value
one if child i dropped out of school during year t, otherwise it
is equal to zero. With school ﬁxed eﬀects we are able to control
for time-invariant unobservable school characteristics as well as
unobservable geographical characteristics. The control vari-
ables X 0ijt are school size, school size squared, number of Roma
in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of
Roma per class, class size, class size squared, the gender of the
child (=1 if the child is female), age, age squared, and whether
the child is a migrant (=1 if the child was born in the same town
where she attends school). The coeﬃcient of interest (b1) is the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator of the interaction term
between treatment and time that captures the diﬀerence in out-
comes between the treatment and control schools.
Results for the diﬀerent outcomes of interest are reported in
Table 3. For all outcomes we estimate the regressions without
and with controls (columns (1) and (2)). We then split our
sample by gender (columns (3) and (4)) to assess whether the
impact of the intervention diﬀers by gender. 33
Overall, results show that the program had a statistically sig-
niﬁcant impact only on hours of absences: pupils exposed to
the program were on average almost 17 h less absent from
school in a year (0.121 standard deviations). 34 This is espe-
cially the case for male, whose reduction in absences is of
roughly 26 h (5 days) or equivalently 0.176 standard devia-
tions. Dropouts and marks in both subjects are unaﬀectedby the program. At ﬁrst it could seem surprising that dropouts
do not respond to the program, but our preliminary data anal-
ysis has shown that dropouts are not problematic in the lower
four grades. The fact that the inclusion of control variables
does not change the magnitude of our coeﬃcients suggests that
our coeﬃcients are very robustly estimated.
There are only three settlements where children from both
control and treatment schools live together and it is possible
that in these settlements children in Early Enrollee and chil-
dren in Late Enrollee schools interact. If one were to believe
that there were spillover eﬀects from treated children on chil-
dren from control schools, this would imply that coeﬃcients in
our regressions are underestimated.
Placebo regressions. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach
relies on the parallel trends assumption. We assume that, in
the absence of the program, treatment and comparison
schools would have had a parallel trend in the average out-
comes of interest. An obvious way to examine the robustness
of our results is to estimate the same regressions (speciﬁcation
(1)) for the years 2006–07 versus 2007–08 and for the years
2007–08 versus 2008–09. By estimating the same regressions
for pretreatment years, we can test if the outcomes in the
two groups of schools were regular before the introduction
of the program. Signiﬁcant diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence coeﬃcients
in placebo regressions would invalidate our estimation strat-
egy and would question the adequacy of our comparison
group.
Placebo tests are summarized in Table 4 and we do not ﬁnd
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
Table 5. Intensity of treatment
Eﬀect of program in treatment year
All All Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dropouta
treatment * post 0.007 0.001 0.009 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.012)
Intensive * treatment * post 0.008 0.001 0.044 0.038
(0.025) (0.023) (0.044) (0.035)
No. observations 4,167 4,039 1,951 2,088
Absences
Treatment * post 8.707 4.089 1.886 9.058
(7.720) (8.394) (8.324) (11.931)
Intensive * treatment * post 19.312 36.390 9.522 59.759**
(27.119) (24.179) (36.096) (24.684)
No. observations 3,980 3,868 1,871 1,997
Serbianb
Treatment * post 0.027 0.058 0.154* 0.041
(0.078) (0.080) (0.084) (0.094)
Intensive * treatment * post 0.330* 0.307** 0.499** 0.108
(0.169) (0.150) (0.186) (0.151)
Mathematicsb
Treatment * post 0.053 0.078 0.169 0.012
(0.081) (0.080) (0.093) (0.088)
Intensive * treatment * post 0.454** 0.417** 0.680*** 0.161
(0.152) (0.143) (0.179) (0.138)
No. observations 4,085 3,961 1,916 2,045
Controlsc No Yes Yes Yes
School FE No Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the eﬀect of the program on dropouts, absences and Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the
school level are reported in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
aDropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
bMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, percentage of Roma per class, class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, migrant
(=1), and intensive (=1). Intensive is equal to 1 for schools with fewer than 43 Roma.
70 WORLD DEVELOPMENTThe diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates for Serbian and math-
ematics are insigniﬁcant and negative for the period immedi-
ately preceding the introduction of the program (2007–08
versus 2008–09). Even if one were to believe that there was a
trend prior to the program, then our estimates for all out-
comes are underestimating the eﬀect of the program in the
average treatment approach. 35 The placebo regressions sup-
port our claim that Late Enrollees are a good counterfactual
for Early Enrollees.
(ii) Intensity of treatment approach
The design of the intervention permits us to investigate
whether the eﬀect of the program varies with the number of
Roma per school. Each school has only one assistant: the
higher the number of Roma per school, the less intense is
the program. If the assistant has to help a high number of stu-
dents, she will help less each of them: she will be less present
both in regular classes and in activities regarding their home-
work and assignments.
Our intensity speciﬁcation is a variation of the previous
approach; it still uses within-school variation of Roma, but
now we exploit also the variation in the number of Roma
between schools. We divide schools in two equally sized
groups with 19 schools. 36 The dummy intensive is equal toone for schools with fewer than 43 Roma. 37 The main diﬀer-
ence to the prior model is that we interact the dummy intensive
with treatment and time. We believe that diﬀerentiating the
schools in groups helps to better understand the role of the
number of Roma on the impact of the program. The coeﬃ-
cient of interest is now b6.
The intensity of treatment is modeled:
Y ijt ¼ b0 þ dt þ b1treatmentj þ b2treatmentj  postt
þ b3intensive Romajt þ b4intensive Romajt  postt
þ b5intensive Romajt  treatmentj þ b6intensive Romajt
 treatmentj  postt þ eijt ð2Þ
Results with and without controls, and for both genders are
reported in Table 5.
The intensity of the program clearly plays a role in explain-
ing its eﬀects. The lower is the number of Roma in a school,
and similarly the more the assistant can help them, the higher
is the impact on the outcomes of interest. Absences, for
instance, reduce on average by roughly 36 h or equivalently
0.228 standard deviations in a year in schools with less Roma,
compared to Late Enrollee schools. The fall in absences is dri-
ven by a reduction in absences of boys, almost 60 h less. The
Table 6. Intensity of treatment—Placebo
Placebo tests for pretreatment years
2006–07 and 2007–08 2007–08 and 2008–09
All Female Male All Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropouta
Intensive * treatment * post 0.010 0.056 0.037 0.014 0.072 0.042
(0.016) (0.050) (0.039) (0.019) (0.040) (0.035)
No. observations 3,640 1,776 1,864 3,897 1,897 2,000
Absences
Intensive * treatment * post 39.511 89.215 11.344 7.490 40.031 25.702
(42.393) (60.105) (34.917) (26.991) (34.883) (25.084)
No. observations 3,542 1,732 1,810 3,788 1,850 1,938
Serbianb
intensive * treatment * post 0.002 0.145 0.164 0.113 0.039 0.240
(0.148) (0.190) (0.184) (0.163) (0.187) (0.207)
Mathematicsb
Intensive * treatment * post 0.026 0.150 0.199 0.011 0.135 0.100
(0.169) (0.208) (0.205) (0.133) (0.189) (0.159)
No. observations 3,585 1,750 1,835 3,846 1,876 1,970
Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results of the placebo regressions for pretreatment years for the intensity of treatment approach. The outcomes of the regressions are
dropouts, absences, Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: *signiﬁcant
at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
aDropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
bMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per class,
class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, migrant (=1), and intensive (=1). Intensive is equal to 1 for schools with fewer than 43 Roma.
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Marks in both Serbian and mathematics increase for pupils
in Early Enrollee schools with a lower number of Roma, but
again these eﬀects do not result in schools with a higher num-
ber of Roma. The impacts are especially large for girls, for
whom being in a school with a lower number of Roma seems
to be more favorable: on average, if exposed to the program in
a school with less Roma, their marks in Serbian and mathe-
matics increase by 0.499 (0.419 standard deviations) and
0.680 (0.581 standard deviations). The improvement in test
scores is larger in mathematics than in languages and this dif-
ferent response to interventions by subject has been found also
in other studies (Fryer, 2014). Possible explanations for the
disparity in treatment eﬀects by subject area are oﬀered in
Fryer (2014). One theory suggests that language skill develop-
ment occurs at an earlier age than the development of higher
cognitive skills. Another prominent theory suggests that
language acquisition and reading test scores are inﬂuenced
by factors outside the classroom. This is plausible because
language skills are used more outside of the classroom than
mathematics skills. 38
Placebo regressions. We estimate placebo regressions of esti-
mation (2) for the years 2006–07 versus 2007–08 and for the
years 2007–08 versus 2008–09. Placebo tests are summarized
in Table 6.
The coeﬃcients for school grades are positive, but not sig-
niﬁcant for the period preceding the program (2007–08 versus
2008–09). The coeﬃcients we obtain for the treatment year are
much larger than coeﬃcients from our placebo regressions.For instance, in mathematics (Serbian) we obtain an increase
of 0.417 (0.307) in marks in treatment year, and this number
is only 0.011 (0.113) for the pretreatment placebo regression.
Similarly, for absences the coeﬃcient is negative, but with
7.490 h much smaller than the coeﬃcient 36.390 from the
main regression. Again, the placebo regressions conﬁrm that
Late Enrollees are a good counterfactual for Early Enrollees.
(b) Second approach: cohort regressions and triple diﬀerence
We know that assistants worked mostly with the
ﬁrst-grade 39 and in the second approach we compare kids in
the ﬁrst grade (young cohorts) with kids in older grades—sec-
ond, third, and fourth—(old cohorts) in the pre- and treatment
year in Early Enrollee-treated schools. Here we assume that
the diﬀerence in marks between ﬁrst graders’ and second,
third, and fourth graders’ would have been constant over time,
in the absence of the program. We also implicitly assume the
absence of policies targeting speciﬁc grades. With this econo-
metrics strategy, we are able to purge time-invariant school
characteristics. The speciﬁcation in this section informs us
whether the program was successful for the children enrolled
in the ﬁrst grade. We ﬁrst estimate the following regression
for Early Enrollees:
Y ijt ¼ b0 þ b1youngi þ b2postt þ b3youngi  postt þ eijt ð3Þ
where Y ijt are again dropout, hours of absences, and ﬁnal
marks in Serbian and mathematics of child i, in school j and
at time t; youngt is equal to 1 when the child is at the ﬁrst
Table 7. Cohort regression
Eﬀect of program in treatment year
All Female Male
Early enrollees Late enrollees All Early enrollees Late enrollees All Early enrollees Late enrollees All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dropouta
Young * post 0.014 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.031 0.071*** 0.077*** 0.003 0.087*** 0.083***
(0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.028) (0.028)
Young * post * treatment 0.066*** 0.047* 0.087***
(0.022) (0.027) (0.029)
No. observations 2,438 1,601 4,039 1,200 751 1,951 1,238 850 2,088
Absences
Young * post 23.579* 57.493** 54.639** 40.707** 67.618** 67.603** 9.740 52.423** 49.480**
(11.537) (21.263) (22.235) (16.000) (28.938) (26.469) (14.055) (22.036) (24.287)
Young * post * treatment 31.867 28.524 40.337
(24.945) (30.772) (27.852)
No. observations 2,336 1,532 3,868 1,152 719 1,871 1,184 813 1,997
Serbianb
Young * post 0.079 0.255** 0.300*** 0.052 0.284 0.352** 0.101 0.295* 0.328**
(0.102) (0.104) (0.101) (0.113) (0.173) (0.170) (0.161) (0.154) (0.139)
Young * post * treatment 0.382** 0.416* 0.423*
(0.149) (0.215) (0.212)
Mathematicsb
Young * post 0.082 0.241 0.291* 0.019 0.344 0.426* 0.180 0.205 0.239*
(0.116) (0.143) (0.152) (0.132) (0.234) (0.241) (0.155) (0.142) (0.135)
Young * post * treatment 0.381* 0.428 0.412*
(0.194) (0.279) (0.207)
No. observations 2,395 1,567 3,962 1,180 736 1,916 1,215 831 2,046
Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the eﬀect of the program on dropouts, absences, Serbian and mathematics, using the cohort comparison methodology. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school
level are reported in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
aDropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
bMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per class, class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age
squared, migrant (=1) and young (=1). Young is equal to 1 when the child is at the ﬁrst grade.
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Table 8. Cohort regression—Placebo
Placebo tests for pretreatment years
2006–07 and 2007–08 2007–08 and 2008–09
Early enrollees Late enrollees All Early enrollees Late enrollees All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropouta
Young * post 0.003 0.008 0.011 0.020 0.036** 0.037***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
Young * post * treatment 0.010 0.019
(0.024) (0.020)
No. observations 2,259 1,381 3,640 2,389 1,508 3,897
Absences
Young * post 14.021 56.385* 54.237* 9.425 13.207 13.596
(17.068) (27.822) (28.643) (13.600) (16.765) (18.055)
Young * post * treatment 34.591 10.100
(32.454) (23.240)
No. observations 2,203 1,339 3,542 2,331 1,457 3,788
Serbianb
Young * post 0.030 0.143 0.105 0.167 0.034 0.043
(0.207) (0.194) (0.203) (0.178) (0.154) (0.156)
Young * post * treatment 0.024 0.244
(0.278) (0.231)
Mathematicsb
Young * post 0.164 0.117 0.086 0.101 0.115 0.113
(0.237) (0.180) (0.185) (0.145) (0.197) (0.196)
Young * post * treatment 0.122 0.022
(0.286) (0.239)
No. observations 2,232 1,354 3,586 2,364 1,482 3,846
Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the results of the placebo regressions for pretreatment years for cohort comparison methodology. The outcomes of the regressions are
dropouts, absences, Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: *signiﬁcant
at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
aDropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during the year; otherwise 0.
bMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per class,
class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, migrant (=1) and young (=1). Young is equal to 1 when the child is at the ﬁrst grade.
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The coeﬃcient of interest is now b3 which tells us how the ﬁrst
graders have performed compared to the older grades.
The same regression (3) is then estimated for Late Enrollees
and the triple diﬀerence between treated and control schools
and cohorts is captured by c3 in the following speciﬁcation:
Y ijt ¼ b0 þ b1youngi þ b2postt þ b3youngi  postt
þ c1treatmentj  postt þ c2youngi  treatmentj
þ c3youngi  postt  treatmentj þ eijt ð4Þ
Unlike estimation (3), regression (4) does not control for
possible unobservable diﬀerences between schools. By estimat-
ing cohort regressions on a pooled sample of Early and Late
Enrollees, we can control for government policies targeting
speciﬁc grades. 40
The regressions are estimated with controls and we also
inspect the impacts by gender. Results are shown in Table 7.
When comparing ﬁrst graders with older pupils in only
Early Enrollee schools (column (1)), our coeﬃcients of interest
have, with the exception of absences, the correct sign, but are
not statistically signiﬁcant. We are not overly concerned thatabsences increase, because we observe a similar pattern also
in Late Enrollee-control schools (see column (2) in Table 7).
We believe that the overall increase in dropouts is a conse-
quence of visa liberalization: some families have migrated to
EU countries. 41 Results of the triple interaction for the full
sample are reported in column (3) in Table 7. Coeﬃcients
for dropouts are statistically signiﬁcant. Absences decrease
for the young cohort, but they do not reach statistical signiﬁ-
cance. Pupils exposed to the program in the ﬁrst grade get
higher marks than ﬁrst graders in Late Enrollee-control
schools (with respect to their older mates). This eﬀect is partly
driven by the worse outcomes of ﬁrst-grade pupils in Late
Enrollee-control schools. On average, being in a Early Enrollee
school increases marks in Serbian and mathematics by 0.296
and 0.284 standard deviations for ﬁrst graders.
Placebo regressions. We test the robustness of our results by
estimating placebo regressions (regression (3), (4)) for the
years 2006–07 versus 2007–08 and for the years 2007–08 versus
2008–09 (see Table 8).
None of the relevant coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant. The size of
the coeﬃcient for Serbian for 2007–08 versus 2008–09 is
insigniﬁcant, but not completely negligible. Absences for the
Table 9. Balancing tables for intensity of treament approach for pre- and treatment year
Pre-treatment year Treatment year
Early enrollees Late enrollees Diﬀerence Early enrollees Late enrollees Diﬀerence
(1) (2) (3) (1)  (2) (4) (5) (6) (4)  (5)
Dropouta
Less Roma 0.015 0.026 0.011 0.035 0.044 0.009
(0.016) (0.026)
More Roma 0.021 0.019 0.002 0.023 0.033 0.010
(0.007) (0.010)
Absences (h)
Less Roma 143.691 146.399 2.708 141.220 171.947 30.727
(33.530) (39.283)
More Roma 109.800 120.637 10.837 131.583 151.127 19.544
(13.648) (18.262)
Serbianb
Less Roma 2.529 2.613 0.084 2.680 2.461 0.219
(0.234) (0.212)
More Roma 2.397 2.531 0.135 2.436 2.598 0.162
(0.147) (0.167)
Mathematicsb
Less Roma 2.380 2.513 0.133 2.549 2.281 0.268
(0.219) (0.213)
More Roma 2.252 2.337 0.085 2.305 2.443 0.138
(0.151) (0.182)
This table reports the results of balancing tests for pretreatment and treatment year for the intensity of treatment approach. Robust standard errors
corrected for clustering at the school level are reported in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
aDropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during that year; otherwise 0.
bMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
74 WORLD DEVELOPMENTtwo placebo tests are positive, but we obtain a reduction in
absences for the treatment year. Similarly, the sign of the coef-
ﬁcient suggests a worsening of marks for Serbian for younger
cohorts, exactly the opposite of what we ﬁnd for the year of
treatment.5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we estimate the impact of the Roma Teaching
Assistant Program in its ﬁrst year of implementation on school-
ing outcomes. We use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach by
exploiting the gradual introduction of the program. We argue
that the assignment to enter the program earlier/later can be
treated “as if random”. As an additional check, we use a second
econometric strategy.We compare pupils of the ﬁrst grade from
treated schools with older cohorts from the same schools. This
econometric strategy controls well for school-speciﬁc character-
istics, but we are not able to control for government interven-
tions over the observed period. We can combine the two
approaches (Early–Late Enrollees with cohort analysis) and
estimate the triple diﬀerence between young and old cohorts
in treated and control schools.
Results of our analysis show that the program had on aver-
age a positive eﬀect. There is evidence that absences fell by
0.121 standard deviations in treated schools (17 h, i.e., three
to four days). The remedial education part of the program tar-
geted mainly ﬁrst graders. Our analysis suggests that, for this
group, marks have improved by almost 0.296 standard devia-
tions in Serbian and 0.284 standard deviations in mathematics.
For the lower primary school grades, dropouts are low in both
Early and Late Enrollees and are not a major problem. Higher
impacts are obtained in schools with a lower number of Roma:
the higher is their number, the less the assistant can help them,and the lower is the impact of the program on the outcomes of
interest. In schools with fewer Roma, girls seem to beneﬁt
more from the program in terms of better marks, whereas boys
exhibit lower absences. With our data it is not possible to
explain this diﬀerential impact of the program. We do not
know if assistants worked more with girls (boys) or if girls
(boys) responded better to the program in the case of marks
(absences).
While ﬁrst graders in treated schools perform better than
their older colleagues, overall the program does not seem to
have a signiﬁcant impact on pupils’ achievement. This is likely
the case because assistants work mainly with lower grades and
young cohorts are those really exposed to them. Therefore, the
general modest eﬀects should not be interpreted as a failure of
the program. Moreover, this study looks only at its impact in
the ﬁrst year. It is possible that assistants and schools need
some time to adjust to the new role of the assistant and that
the full beneﬁt from them will come at a later stage. This idea
is also supported by the literature on the importance of the
experience of teachers which emphasizes that gains in teaching
skills are largest in the initial years of teaching (Rivkin,
Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). Still, our results suggest that the
program is more eﬀective in schools with less Roma. We are
aware that it is possible that there are systematic diﬀerences
between schools with a lower and a higher share of Roma.
One could argue, for instance, that Roma in schools with a
lower share are more willing to adapt and assimilate to the
majority population. We cannot be certain that the same
eﬀects could be attained in schools with higher percentage of
Roma if more assistants were assigned to these schools. It still
seems plausible that if the goal of the policy maker is to close
the gap in schooling outcomes, then more Roma teaching
assistants should be assigned to schools with more Roma stu-
dents.
Table 10. Intensity of treatment: Sensitivity analysis
1st decile Up to 2nd decile Up to 3rd decile Up to 4th decile Up to 5th decile Up to 6th decile Up to 7th decile Up to 8th decile Up to 9th decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dropouta
Intensive * treatment * post 0.032 0.031 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.005
(0.032) (0.037) (0.033) (0.029) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.012)
Absences
Intensive * treatment * post 47.636 47.970 75.063** 49.650* 36.390 20.643 11.530 12.136 7.308
(34.443) (34.788) (31.415) (29.079) (24.179) (17.668) (16.936) (15.706) (13.351)
Serbianb
Intensive * treatment * post 0.204 0.500 0.457** 0.364** 0.307** 0.217* 0.265** 0.175 0.133
(0.136) (0.354) (0.190) (0.163) (0.150) (0.122) (0.105) (0.105) (0.091)
Mathematicsb
Intensive * treatment * post 0.806*** 0.650** 0.617*** 0.422** 0.417*** 0.391*** 0.347*** 0.280** 0.353***
(0.126) (0.258) (0.214) (0.178) (0.143) (0.121) (0.117) (0.105) (0.080)
No. observations 3,961 3,961 3,961 3,961 3,961 3,961 3,961 3,961 3,961
Controlsc Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the eﬀect of the program on dropout, absences, Serbian and mathematics for diﬀerent thresholds. We order the schools based on the number of Roma in a school. In column (1) we
deﬁne the program as “intensive” in schools of the 1st decile (max. 16 Roma per school), column (2) up to 2nd decile (max. 23 Roma per school), column (3) up to 3rd decile (max. 29 Roma per school),
column (4) up to 4th decile (max. 34 Roma per school), column (5) up to 5th decile (max. 43 Roma per school), column (6) up to 6th decile (max. 48 Roma per school), column (7) up to 7th decile (max.
52 Roma per school), column (8) up to 8th decile (max. 66 Roma per school), column (9) up to 9th decile (max. 116 Roma per school). Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level
are reported in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
aDropout is equal to 1 if child dropped out of school during that year; otherwise 0.
bMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
c Controls included are school size, school size squared, percentage of Roma per class, class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, migrant (=1), and intensive (=1). Intensive is equal to 1
in column (1) if school falls into ﬁrst decile, in column (2) if school falls into ﬁrst or second decile, etc.
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Table 11. Average treatment approach—Non Roma
Eﬀect of program in treatment year on Non Roma
Absences Serbiana Mathematicsa
(1) (2) (3)
Post 5.025*** 0.011 0.011
(1.185) (0.031) (0.018)
Treatment * post 1.586 0.054 0.029
(1.725) (0.034) (0.025)
No. observations 14,686 14,982 14,981
Controlsb Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the eﬀect of the program on Non Roma for absences, Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the
school level are reported in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
aMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
bControls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per class,
class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, and migrant (=1).
Table 12. Cohort regression—Non Roma
Eﬀect of program in treatment year on Non Roma
Absences Serbiana Mathematicsa
Early
enrollees
Late
enrollees
All Early
enrollees
Late
enrollees
All Early
enrollees
Late
enrollees
All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Young * post 0.658 3.178 3.259 0.033 0.056 0.066 0.044 0.062 0.070
(2.682) (3.274) (3.057) (0.072) (0.077) (0.069) (0.058) (0.085) (0.079)
Young * post * treatment 2.787 0.037 0.049
(4.986) (0.107) (0.111)
No. observations 8,099 6,587 14,686 8,232 6,750 14,982 8,232 6,749 14,981
Controlsb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the eﬀect of the program on Non Roma for absences, Serbian and mathematics. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the
school level are reported in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10%, **signiﬁcant at 5%, ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
aMarks range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). They are categorical.
bControls included are school size, school size squared, number of Roma in school, number of Roma in school squared, percentage of Roma per class,
class size, class size squared, female (=1), age, age squared, migrant (=1) and young (=1). Young is equal to 1 when the child is at the ﬁrst grade.
76 WORLD DEVELOPMENTWe are not able to delve into the mechanism which drives
our results and our estimates are derived from reduced form
regressions. Still, our results could and probably are driven
by two main mechanisms. First, the RTA intervention alters
the inputs of the education production function. Moreover,
negative stereotypes about Roma students are softened and
teachers could provide more support in learning. The input
of teaching is augmented and this can explain better marks
of ﬁrst-grade students. A second mechanism possibly at play
is the cultural transmission of preferences for education. The
presence of a person coming from the same Roma ethnic back-
ground could alter the preferences for education and beliefs of
Roma pupils, which induces them to attend more school and
to exert more eﬀort at school.
In the context of the literature on schooling of Roma com-
munities, our study makes two important contributions. First,
to our knowledge there are no rigorous evaluations of other
educational interventions targeting Roma children and our
study is the ﬁrst step in this direction. Ideally, the policy maker
would like to know about a range of possible policies and their
exact eﬀects and costs. Our study provides clear evidence
about the eﬀects of the RTA Program on a range of outcomes.
Second, a key part of the RTA Program is the role modelcomponent, that is the teaching assistants have the same back-
ground as the treated children. The success of this program is
likely to be related to this fact because the assistants know well
the Roma culture and are accepted by the Roma community.
Thus, our study suggests that programs targeting Roma
should take into account their culture and speciﬁcity and
ensure that the program gets accepted by the community.
This paper has laid the foundations for understanding better
the RTA Program, but some limitations of the study exist and
need to be pointed out. The nation we study is a
post-communist nation and we believe that our ﬁndings are
suggestive and applicable also to other Eastern European
countries which share a similar political history with Serbia,
but not necessarily to all other countries. During communism
the Eastern European countries have implemented inclusive
policies toward Roma and in this period the situation of Roma
improved despite the fact that they remained at the bottom of
all socio-economic indicators (Barany, 2000). In these coun-
tries Roma are predominantly sedentary and their assimilation
process, especially with respect to education, has started a
while ago.
In this paper we look only at the short-term eﬀects. The
impacts we observe are suggestive of positive potential
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to school and this, in the long-run, can lead to persistent eﬀects
in the labor market and improvement in Roma well-being and
social inclusion. Moreover, negative stereotypes about Roma
students can be softened and this in turn can aﬀect positivelyboth the school environment and school quality. The medium-
and long-run eﬀects would be more informative on the real
success of the program. Future research in this direction is
highly advised in order to understand fully the eﬀectiveness
of the program.NOTES1. The number of Roma and the subsequent numbers refer to the
following countries: Albania, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Republic
of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.
2. In 2011, the share of Roma aged 10–18 who have never attended
school varies among countries and it can reach percentages above 20.
Primary school attendance rates are in the range of 60% to 80% in most
countries, with some countries going from 40% to 50% (Brueggemann,
2012).
3. The Serbian name of the program is Romski Asistenti–Pomoc´ u
Nastavi.
4. Almost all the empirical literature on aﬃrmative actions focuses on the
United States experience. There are some studies in developing countries,
especially in India, where the debate on aﬃrmative action to address the
issues of inclusion and equity has been in place for a long time (Basant &
Sen, 2014). In Europe less extensive investigation has been carried on in
this respect.
5. Strictly speaking this study bases its conclusions on correlations and
not on causal inference.
6. Kertesi and Kezdi (2011) report a gap of one standard deviation for
reading and mathematics in the eight grade between Roma and Non
Roma in Hungary. The gap disappears in reading and decreases by 85% in
mathematics when accounting for health, family background, and school
and class ﬁxed eﬀects. In Serbia, using national assessments, Baucal (2006)
reports that in the third grade of primary school Roma children are
already lacking behind their Non Roma peers. The achievement gap
decreases by 40% when the lower socio-economical status of Roma is
taken into account.
7. Recent literature emphasizes the importance of aﬀecting the demand
for education. A prominent type of demand side programs are conditional
cash transfers which raised enrollment and attendance in many developing
countries (Schultz, 2004). The provision of ﬁnancial incentives is an
alternative intervention operating on the demand side (Fryer, 2011).
8. Special schools are schools for children with special educational needs.
9. With few exceptions, the rest declare Romani to be their mother
tongue.
10. 64 out of 78 schools that applied had a percentage of Roma between
5% and 40%. Among these 64, OSCE selected 19 schools (out of 26) with a
preschool program, ﬁve schools (out of 36) with no preschool program
and two schools (out of two) for which no information is available.
11. The following criteria were taken into account for the ranking of the
assistants’ applications: highest level of education completed or enrolled
(from 10 to 30 points), experience in working with Roma children (0–10
points), experience in working on projects related to education (0–10
points), motivation (0–10 points), attendance of relevant seminars and/orcourses (0–10 points), experience as Roma teaching assistant (0–10
points), knowledge of Romani (0–10 points) and additional points (0–10
points).
12. Unfortunately we do not have information on the availability of a
preschool program for schools applying in 2010–11. Nonetheless, it is
worthy to recall that some schools without the compulsory preschool
program have also been selected in the previous year.
13. Roma pupils joining Early Enrollee schools in the pretreatment yea
r—2008–09—corresponded to 29% of all Roma enrolled in these schools.
In Late Enrollees they were 26%. In the ﬁrst year of the program—2009–
10—these percentages were 29% and 28%. The number of Roma pupils
enrolling at school for the ﬁrst time remained the same in Early Enrollee
schools and increased slightly in Late Enrollee schools. The diﬀerence
between the two types of schools is neglibible.
14. There was a suggested time allocation. The 30 weekly hours of the
assistant could be distributed in the following way: work at school (19 h),
work with the local community, (8 h) and writing reports and documen-
tation (3 h).
15. In most cases Roma live in segregated settlements so that assistants
can go to the settlement and visit several families at once.
16. In total, the assistants attended 22 working days of seminars and
courses in the scholastic year 2009–10. Regular seminars provided the
opportunity to the Ministry to understand the problems of the assistants
and guide them through the initial diﬃculties. In 2010–11 a set of nine
modules, which all assistants had to attend in their ﬁrst year of service, was
devised.
17. In total, there were 26 schools which got an assistant in 2009–10. In 3
schools we were not allowed to collect data. These schools do not diﬀer
from the other schools either in the number of pupils or in the percentage
of Roma children and they are located in diﬀerent areas: one in Belgrade,
one in Central Serbia, and one in the South.
18. A district is made up of more municipalities. In Serbia there are 24
districts and 160 municipalities.
19. In a few cases the school chosen was not available and we needed to
select the second option.
20. 10 schools are located in Belgrade; eight schools in the central area of
the nation (ﬁve schools in the municipality of Valjevo and three in the
municipality of Novi Sad); 12 schools in South-Eastern Serbia (three
schools in the municipality of Jagodina, two in Kragujevac, three in
Krusˇevac, three in Zajecˇar, and one in Pozˇarevac); eight schools in the
South of the nation (six schools in the municipality of Leskovac and two
in the municipality of Nisˇ). We deﬁne urban area as a municipality with
more than 35,000 inhabitants.
21. More detailed information regarding the primary education system in
Serbia is provided in Section A.1 in the Appendix.
78 WORLD DEVELOPMENT22. Roma in Serbia are mainly sedentary: they do not move much within
the nation. Nonetheless, there is a substantial out-migration, especially
toward the European Union, and in the last years in-migration has
increased due to the wars in Ex-Yugoslavia. Many Roma refugees in
Serbia come from Kosovo.
23. In Serbia, primary school consists of 8 years: children enroll if they
are aged at least 6.5 years at the start of the scholastic year in September.
In the lower four grades of primary school students are usually aged 6.5–
10.5.
24. The only statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence is in the place of birth:
there are less migrant children in treated schools.
25. There is vast evidence on gender gaps in education and their
underlying causes. Buchmann, DiPrete, and McDaniel (2008) give a very
good review of the literature.
26. In the pre-treatment year, by combining both types of school
together, we observe that girls’ dropouts are 0.01—versus 0.006 of boys—
and their absences correspond to 122 h—versus 119 of boys. Diﬀerences
by gender are here not statistically signiﬁcant.
27. In India, where early marriage is also a common phenomenon,
Maertens (2013) shows that perceptions of the ideal age of marriage
signiﬁcantly constrains the education that parents aspire to have for their
daughters. Moreover, such aspirations are not sensitive to the perceived
returns to higher education. That is not the case for boys.
28. In both rounds the program was advertised in newspapers Politika
and Prosvetni Pregled, the last being a newspaper for people working in
the education sector; in addition to the advertisement, in 2010–11 schools’
directorates—one directorate may be responsible for more than a
municipality—informed schools directly.
29. 47% of schools which applied in 2009, and did not get selected, did it
again in 2010 and two thirds of them got selected in the second year (16
out of 26 schools applying in both years). Among these schools, only two
schools, corresponding to 12.5%, is present in our subsample.
30. Schools which applied in 2010 are in the same areas of schools of
2009 and they have almost the same percentage of Roma, on average
13.99% compared to 13.07%. They are not statistically diﬀerent
(p-value = 0.458). These are the only information we have on schools
which applied and did not get selected. These percentages are diﬀerent
from those reported in Table 1 because in Table 1 we only refer to the ﬁrst
four grades of primary school. Here we have percentages corresponding to
all eight grades of primary schools.
31. In both rounds the committee gave priority to schools in the poorest
municipalities or with huge Roma settlements (Subotica, Novi Sad, Nisˇ,
Kragujevac, Belgrade).
32. This method is similar in spirit to Duﬂo (2004).
33. We also control for the gender of the assistant, but it does not turn
out to be signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation.
34. On average, Roma pupils are absent from school 143 h (28 days) in a
year.35. Remember that we expect the coeﬃcient of treatment*post in our
main regression to be positive for marks (Serbian and mathematics).
36. The average school number of Roma between the two years—pre-
and treatment year—is used to deﬁne the two groups. The threshold is
here 43 pupils in a school. Our balance tests for the pretreatment year are
reported in the Appendix (Table 9).
37. In A.2 we vary the threshold and we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of the
program is stronger, the lower the threshold. This is exactly what we
would expect. Remember that this approach delivers the eﬀect of the
program on schools for which we deﬁne, based on the threshold, that the
program is intensive. A lower threshold means that less Roma are in that
school and for this reason the program is more eﬀective.
38. For the corresponding references from the education literature see
Fryer (2014).
39. We know this fact from informal discussions with assistants. We have
also conﬁrmed this fact with survey data for Belgrade schools (only a
subsample of schools) for which we have collected additional data. In
treated schools, the children with whom the assistant actually worked
were, on average, 9.73 years old, whereas children with whom the
assistant did not work, were 10.44 years old (Battaglia & Lebedinski,
2014).
40. For instance, free schools books for ﬁrst grade or lower repetition
rates in general.
41. Dropouts are included in our regressions and have a high number of
hours of absences.
42. The obligatory preschool program has been introduced in order to
facilitate the transition to school for children from lower socio-economic
backgrounds. In the initial years the capacities of preschool institutions
were not suﬃcient to enroll all preschool children. Hence, some children,
mainly from poorer families or in rural areas, could not be enrolled in
preschool. However, due to the lack in the enforcement of the law, they
were allowed to enroll in school also without having attended the
compulsory preschool program.
43. On average, in Serbia costs associated with school (books and other
school material) correspond to almost 2% of yearly household income
(LSMS, 2003). Based on a survey we conducted in Belgrade, for Roma
people these costs account for 6% of their yearly household income.
44. We calculate the cost for accommodation and stay during the
training to be 40 Euros per day plus transport costs of 10 Euros for seven
travels. This amounts to 950 Euros. There were 22 days of training and we
add additional 14 days for preparation of training and reporting. The cost
of trainers is 150 Euros per day and the wage cost is 5,400 Euros.
Accommodation, stay, and travel costs of trainers are 1,510 Euros
(22 days * 40 Euros + 7 travels * 10 Euros). Therefore, the total costs
for trainers including their stay and accommodation is 6,910. Dividing this
sum with 26 (number of assistants) gives 265 Euros per assistant. The cost
of accommodation per assistant (950 Euros) plus training per assistant
(265 Euros) adds up to a total cost of the training of 1,215 Euros.
45. 450 Euros * 12 month [wages] * 23 schools/1,268 Roma stu-
dents = 97.95 Euros.
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A.1 Primary education system in Serbia
In Serbia, school is compulsory until age 15. Children enroll
at primary school if they are aged at least 6.5 years at the start
of the scholastic year in September. Since 2007 the attendance
of at least 6 months of a cost-free preschool program is com-
pulsory; in 2010 the length of the compulsory preschool has
been extended to 9 months. 42
80 WORLD DEVELOPMENTPrimary school consists of 8 years. In the ﬁrst four grades
pupils get one teacher who teaches all compulsory subjects
except English, while in the upper four years pupils have one
teacher per subject. In the ﬁrst-grade teachers use descriptive
marks; from the second grade on, the range of marks is 1–5
with 1 being the insuﬃcient and worst mark. The marks are
categorical. During each semester, a child gets four marks
for each subject. Out of the four marks, at least two marks
are derived from written tests. The teacher can decide what
to use as assessment for the remaining two marks. She could
give additional written tests, give marks based on oral exami-
nation, homework or class participation (students’ motivation
and eﬀort are taken into account by the teacher). The ﬁnal
mark at the end of the year is the arithmetic mean of eight
marks. If a pupil gets at least one insuﬃcient mark at the
end of the year, her teacher can decide whether to let her pass
to the upper grade or to ask her to take the retake exam in
August. In the last few years the Ministry of Education has
suggested that schools reduce repetition rates, especially in
the lower four grades.
There are no school fees for primary school, but indi-
rect costs such as books and other school material can
pose a considerable cost for some parents. 43 The Ministry
of Education aims at reducing the cost of education and
the ﬁrst graders in 2009–10 are the ﬁrst generation to
receive free text books. The plan is that this generation
and all younger generations obtain free school books in
the future.
A.2 Sensitivity analysis of the threshold of intensity of treatment
In the main body of this paper, we examine how the eﬀect of
the program varies based on the number of Roma in a school.
We split the schools in two equally sized groups based on the
number of Roma in the school. We deﬁne a dummy ‘intensive’
which takes value 1 if a school is among schools with less
Roma (at most 43 Roma children), and value 0 if a school is
among schools with more Roma (more than 43 Roma chil-
dren). Our balance tests for the pretreatment year are reported
in Table 9.
In this section we report how our results change when we
vary this threshold. Table 10 shows the results of the intensity
of treatment approach for diﬀerent thresholds.
We rank the schools based on the number of Roma, starting
with the lowest, and then divide the schools in 10 deciles. Col-
umn (1) of the table reports the results if we set the dummy ‘in-
tensive’ equal to 1 for schools in the ﬁrst decile and 0
otherwise. In column (2) we set the dummy “intensive” equal
to 1 for schools in the ﬁrst and second decile, and 0 otherwise,
etc. The reported coeﬃcient (intensive * treatment * post) cap-
tures the eﬀect of the program on treated children in schools
where the program is “intensive”. Essentially, going from the
left to the right columns we increase the number of schools
and thus the number children for which we consider the pro-
gram to be “intensive”. For instance, in column (1) children
in schools with less than 16 Roma are considered to be treated.
In column (2) this number rises to 23 Roma per school, etc.
We expect that the eﬀect of the program drops as we go from
left to the right columns and this is exactly what this table
shows. The results in Table 10 are only indicative and should
be interpreted with caution especially for the lower deciles. For
lower deciles we consider only very few schools to be actually
treated (in the case of column (1) only one treated school falls
into the ﬁrst decile).A.3 Cost of the program
This section aims to give an estimate of the cost of the pro-
gram and to contrast this program to alternative interventions
available to the government. At this early stage of the program
it is not possible to provide an estimate of the monetary ben-
eﬁts. Still, we discuss two possible channels through which this
program could aﬀect future labor market outcomes and thus,
could have a monetary gain. First, the program could raise
completion rates of primary school and consequently, the
average educational attainment of treated Roma children.
Higher educational attainment implies higher earnings
(Angrist & Krueger, 1991). We do not ﬁnd that dropout rates
fall overall, because in the lower 4 grades of primary school
the dropout rates are already low. Primary school lasts 8 years
and we believe that dropout rates in the higher grade (from 5th
to 8th) are the ones actually aﬀected by the program. A second
channel through which the program could aﬀect children’s
labor market outcomes is through better marks. Several stud-
ies (Currie & Thomas, 1999; Murnane, Willett, & Levy, 1995;
Neal & Johnson, 1996) have demonstrated a positive relation-
ship between pupils’ attainments at school and their subse-
quent earnings.
The main cost of the program is the (gross) wages of the
assistants which amount to 450 Euros per month. In addition
to that, in 2009–10, assistants attended seven trainings totaling
up to 22 days. Our estimation suggests that the training per
assistant had a cost of approximately 1,200 Euros. 44 The
turnover of the assistants in the ﬁrst year was very low with
only two people quitting in that period. This is especially
important because it indicates that training costs will not be
born each year. Not taking into account the training costs,
we calculate that the program cost 100 Euros per Roma stu-
dent per year. 45 We know that in Belgrade 53% of Roma chil-
dren were actually treated (Battaglia & Lebedinski, 2014),
assuming that the take-up rate was the same also in the whole
of Serbia, this yields a cost of 200 Euros per treated child.
There are no cost estimates of other programs in Serbia to
which this program could be directly compared. We still dis-
cuss two other measures which we consider alternatives to
the RTA Program. One possible alternative would be to use
professional teachers to give remedial education classes. The
gross wage of teachers is in the range of 900 to 1,200 Euros
depending on the experience and thus twice the amount paid
to the assistants. Assuming that two assistants have at least
the same performance as one teacher, the RTA Program is
more cost eﬀective. Aside from being less costly, an additional
advantage of the Roma Teaching Assistants is that they act as
role models for Roma children and this cannot be easily quan-
tiﬁed in monetary terms. A second option available to the pol-
icy maker would be class size reduction, but this intervention
did not yield satisfactory results in some settings (Hoxby,
2000) and is a very costly intervention. Another disadvantage
of the class size reduction is that it does not speciﬁcally target
disadvantaged children.
All of these facts, taken together, indicate that the program
is with 200 Euros per child per year not overly costly and that
it also performs well with respect to its alternatives.
A.4 Spillover eﬀects—Non Roma pupils
We can investigate whether this program also aﬀects Non
Roma pupils. We employ both econometric strategies and
their combination and ﬁnd that neither absences reduced nor
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Roma assistant does not improve Non Roma schooling out-
comes. Results are reported in Tables 11 and 12.
These results, combined together with the previous ones,
provide some evidence that the program is succeeding inreducing the gap between Roma and Non Roma children,
both in school achievements and attendance.ScienceDirect
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